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High prices are their own worst enemy. Increased profi t margins entice entrepreneur-
ial investment, which results in in-
creased production. Lower market 
prices inevitably follow. The magic 
hand of Adam Smith ensures that 
winners’ gains and losers’ losses 
will be temporary, as entrepreneurs 
correct market imbalances. 
The temporary nature of high 
prices is well known to corn, soy-
bean, and wheat farmers. Over the 
last 50 years there have been only 
two corn price increases that have 
been sustained for more than two 
years. The fi rst was from 1973 to 
1975 when a combination of short 
crops around the world and in-
creased export demand dramati-
cally increased prices. The second 
was from 1979 to 1984 when high 
corn prices were sustained by sup-
ply controls, government-defended 
fl oor prices, and drought. Farmers 
in the United States and around 
the world have always been able to 
out-produce the market and govern-
ment policy. 
Farmers have a strong incen-
tive to continually adopt cost-
reducing and yield-enhancing 
technologies. Thus, even when 
prices are low, agricultural sup-
ply tends to increase, as farmers 
seek out the seemingly never-end-
ing advances in seed technology, 
improved pest management, and 
more productive machinery. When 
prices are high, farmers have the 
added incentive to bring more land 
into production and to plant the 
crops that bring the greatest eco-
nomic return. 
Because farmers have tradition-
ally produced ingredients that are 
turned into food, the demand for 
farm products refl ects character-
istics of that demand. World food 
demand depends primarily on popu-
lation and income, both of which ex-
pand predictably and slowly. When 
production of food ingredients out-
strips the growth in food demand 
for more than a year or two, prices 
inevitably decline. The resulting 
price declines can be large because 
food demand is quite insensitive to 
price. There really is only so much 
food any person can eat.
Nonstop increases in supply 
combined with slow and predictable 
demand growth have resulted in a 
seemingly inexorable long-run trend 
of falling infl ation-adjusted agricul-
tural prices intermixed with one or 
two years of high prices caused by 
unexpected supply disruptions. In 
agriculture, as with most other com-
modities, it has not been a question 
of if price bubbles will burst but 
only a matter of when. 
A New Era for Agriculture?
The last period of high prices was in 
1995 when the season-average price 
of corn rose to $3.24 per bushel. 
At the height of concern that 1996 
production would not be suffi cient 
to meet demand, 1996 new-crop 
futures rose as high as $3.83 in July 
before beginning a fi ve-year de-
cline. It is noteworthy that Chicago 
Board of Trade corn prices did not 
indicate that such high prices were 
permanently with us. Futures prices 
for the 1997 crop never rose above 
$3.08 and futures prices for the 
1998 crop never rose above $3.00 
per bushel. It is clear that traders 
believed that the high prices in 1995 
and 1996 were unsustainable in that 
a return to normal crop conditions 
would result in lower prices. A drop 
in demand caused by the late-1990s 
Asian fi nancial crises caused prices 
to drop even further than traders 
thought likely.
The futures market is telling us a 
very different story today. Although 
we are coming off a record corn har-
vest, the 2008 new-crop corn har-
vest is more than $5.00 per bushel. 
The new-crop soybean futures price 
is more than $12.50 per bushel. In 
contrast to the 1995/96 high price 
period, the markets today are not 
indicating that these record prices 
are temporary. Farmers can sell their 
2009 and 2010 crops for about the 
same price. 
The impacts on agriculture 
would be staggering if these price 
levels were permanent. For example, 
current prices imply that land rents 
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in Iowa and the rest of the Corn Belt 
should increase by a factor of about 
2.8, even after accounting for the 
loss of government payments, the 
higher production costs associated 
with increased demand for inputs, 
and increased returns to manage-
ment and machinery. As land rents 
go, so too do land prices. Iowa State 
University’s annual land price sur-
vey showed that in 2005 the average 
acre of farmland in Iowa was val-
ued at $2,914. That year is a useful 
benchmark for land values because 
crop prices had not yet increased. 
Multiplying the 2005 land value by 
2.8 suggests that $5.00 corn and 
$12.00 soybeans could support aver-
age land values in excess of $8,000 
per acre.
Crop prices at these levels dra-
matically increase the cost of raising 
hogs, fi nishing cattle, and produc-
ing milk and eggs. These costs will 
have to be passed on to consumers 
through higher retail prices for meat, 
eggs, and dairy products to keep live-
stock producers in business. Com-
petition for land between specialty 
crops, oilseeds, and food and feed 
grains will also increase the prices of 
other products such as hops, malting 
barley, beans, and vegetables. Con-
sequently, we should expect to see 
increased food prices over the next 
year or two as these cost increases 
are passed on to consumers.
But how much faith should we 
put in the Chicago Board of Trade as 
a long-run indicator of price levels, 
particularly when all the world’s 
farmers face an unprecedented in-
centive to increase production? How 
can we reconcile what the markets 
are telling us with the iron rule of 
market economics that the cure for 
high prices is high prices?  
Impact of the New Energy Bill
On December 6, 2007, the U.S. House 
of Representatives passed its ver-
sion of the new energy bill that 
was later combined with a Senate 
version of the bill and signed by 
President Bush on December 19. 
Early December is an important 
time for commodity prices because 
the House indicated for the fi rst 
time that it would include an ex-
panded renewable fuels standard 
for corn ethanol and a new mandate 
for biodiesel. On December 1, the 
price of December 2009 corn was 
$4.15 per bushel. By January 14, this 
price had increased to over $5.00 
per bushel. The price of November 
2009 soybeans increased from $9.51 
to $12.40 per bushel over the same 
period. An examination of the short- 
and long-run impacts of the new 
corn ethanol mandate can help rec-
oncile the laws of economics with 
what is happening on the Chicago 
Board of Trade.
Corn ethanol use is mandated to 
grow from 9 billion gallons this year 
to 13.2 billion gallons in 2012 and to 
15 billion gallons in 2015. Accounting 
for the distillers grain that replaces 
the corn that is used to produce 
ethanol, and the expected growth in 
average yields, this level of produc-
tion will require 16.2, 23.2, and 25.5 
million acres of corn, respectively, 
to be devoted solely to ethanol pro-
duction. The required level of corn 
production will occur, but only if 
farmers are compensated through 
high prices. 
 
How Quickly and How Far Can 
Prices Drop?
Congress adopted new corn ethanol 
and biodiesel mandates during a time 
when world supplies of corn, wheat, 
and oilseeds are tight. Thus, the mar-
kets quickly responded by signaling 
the world’s farmers to increase pro-
duction. How quickly production can 
ramp up internationally will determine 
when commodity prices start retreat-
ing. The key countries and regions to 
watch are the United States, Brazil, Ar-
gentina, the European Union, Ukraine, 
and Russia. 
The 2008 supply picture in 
South America indicates at most a 
small increase in production. U.S. 
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production capacity can be quickly 
increased only by good growing 
conditions or a signifi cant drop in 
acreage enrolled in the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program. The ability 
of Ukraine and Russia to expand 
production quickly is questionable 
given how far their agricultural sec-
tors have fallen. And any expansion 
of E.U. acreage will likely be devoted 
to meeting their own biofuels man-
dates. An anticipated slow ramp-up 
in production combined with the 
need to meet new demand from 
biofuels mandates is why Board of 
Trade prices are so high for the next 
three crop years.
Over time, however, yield in-
creases, infrastructure investments, 
and expansion of crop acreage will 
all work to increase world supplies; 
the profi t signals are just too high 
for these price levels to be sustain-
able over the long term. Even so, the 
demand expansion from U.S. and 
other countries’ biofuels mandates 
is so large that it is likely that meet-
ing food and fuel demand will require 
higher-cost production practices and 
cultivation of lower-yielding acreage. 
In economic terms, this expansion of 
demand will push world agriculture 
up its long-run supply curve, which 
means that future price levels will be 
permanently higher.
A simple supply and demand 
analysis of three possible future sce-
narios provides insight into how low 
we can expect corn prices to fall. In 
the fi gure, demand for corn to pro-
duce 15 billion gallons of ethanol is in-
sensitive to the price of corn because 
of the mandate. For quantities in 
excess of 15 billion gallons, the analy-
sis assumes that ethanol production 
does not affect the price of gasoline.
Three Scenarios for Price 
Projections
1. Elimination of the $0.51-per-gallon 
subsidy given to wholesale buy-
ers of ethanol, wholesale price 
of gasoline at $2.50, and ethanol 
valued at its energy value
2. Continuation of the $0.51 subsidy, 
$2.50 gasoline, and ethanol valued 
at its energy value
3. No ethanol subsidy, $2.50 gaso-
line, and ethanol valued on a par 
with gasoline value
The critical difference between 
these scenarios is the price of etha-
nol at production levels in excess of 
15 billion gallons. In the fi rst scenar-
io, the additional ethanol will have 
to compete with gasoline without 
subsidy, which implies an ethanol 
price of $1.67 per gallon. This trans-
lates into an ability to pay for corn 
at about $3.12 per bushel. The sec-
ond scenario adds a $0.51-per-gallon 
subsidy, which makes the ethanol 
price equal to $2.18 per gallon, and 
an ability to pay for corn equal to 
$4.52. The third scenario assumes 
that automobile manufacturers and 
blenders optimize fuel pumps and 
car engines so that fuel mileage 
does not decrease with ethanol, 
which implies an ethanol price of 
$2.50 per gallon and an ability to 
pay for corn equal to $5.33.
When ethanol producers’ ability 
to pay for corn (indicated by the de-
mand curves in the chart) in excess 
of the mandate is less than the price 
of corn needed by U.S. corn farmers 
to supply the required corn to meet 
the mandate (indicated by where the 
supply curve in the chart intersects 
15 billion gallons), then the mandate 
will bind and the supply price of 
corn will be $4.00 per bushel. This 
is what occurs in scenario 1. If some 
combination of market demand or 
additional subsidy to ethanol drives 
ethanol producers’ ability to pay 
for corn to above $4.00 at 15 billion 
gallons, then the mandate will not 
bind, the long-run price of corn will 
be greater than $4.00 per bushel, 
and corn ethanol production will 
exceed 15 billion gallons. This oc-
curs in scenarios 2 and 3 when corn 
supply meets corn demand at 21.5 
What Will the Price of Corn Be After the New Mandate Is Met?
8           CENTER FOR AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT         WINTER 2008
Iowa Ag Review
price of Midwest diesel was approxi-
mately $2.80 per gallon, indicating 
a 35¢-per-gallon difference in the 
market demand price for biodiesel 
and diesel. However, to generate a 
market demand price of $4.50 per 
gallon for biodiesel with this level 
of market price premium would 
require crude oil prices of $140 per 
barrel. Exported quantities would 
not be counted toward the renew-
able fuels standard.
Third, the price of biodiesel 
could be increased to $4.50 per gal-
lon if the purchase of biodiesel by 
blenders were subsidized. The subsi-
dy would have to vary inversely with 
the price of diesel to ensure a $4.50 
biodiesel price. If blenders are willing 
to pay 35¢ more per gallon for biodie-
sel than for diesel, then the required 
variable tax credit would equal $4.15 
minus the wholesale price of diesel. 
The cost of meeting the biodiesel 
mandate using tax credits would be 
borne fully by taxpayers. 
Fourth, and lastly, biodiesel pric-
es could be increased enough to cov-
er feedstock costs if the government 
simply mandated that diesel blend-
ers use levels of biodiesel required 
by the EISA. Blenders would have to 
pay biodiesel producers a price high 
enough to allow the producers to 
stay in business to produce the re-
quired volumes. Blenders would then 
have to sell the blender product at 
whatever price they could induce die-
sel consumers to pay. The cost of the 
biodiesel mandate would be shared 
by consumers and blenders. 
Economic Impacts of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act
Passage of the EISA with a one-bil-
lion-gallon biodiesel mandate was 
meant to help a biodiesel industry 
that has been squeezed by low mar-
gins caused by spiraling feedstock 
costs that have outpaced biodiesel 
prices. The mandate will indeed in-
crease the price of biodiesel, either 
through higher subsidies to diesel 
blenders or because blenders are 
forced to pay biodiesel prices high 
enough to allow biodiesel produc-
ers to cover their feedstock costs. 
However, higher biodiesel prices do 
not automatically imply a profi table 
biodiesel industry. The capacity of 
the biodiesel industry will still be 
far in excess of that needed to meet 
the mandate. This excess capac-
ity means that biodiesel prices will 
need to be increased only enough to 
induce biodiesel producers to run 
their plants to produce the required 
amounts of biodiesel. That is, we 
should expect biodiesel prices to 
increase only enough to cover op-
eration costs. If this is the case, then 
owners of biodiesel plants should 
not expect to obtain much, if any, 
return on their invested capital.
This dismal outlook for the U.S. 
biodiesel industry hinges on feed-
stock prices always being bid to the 
industry’s break-even point. Prices 
cannot fall below this point as long 
as excess capacity exists. Prices 
cannot be bid above this point 
because demand for feedstock will 
drop as biodiesel plants stop operat-
ing. This new competitive environ-
ment is reinforced by increased 
biodiesel capacity in Europe, Brazil, 
and Argentina that has resulted 
from their mandates. Consequently, 
the ultimate benefi ciary of expand-
ed biodiesel mandates is not the 
biodiesel industry. Rather, farm-
ers and landowners should expect 
to see the lion’s share of benefi ts 
from these new mandates because 
feedstock prices will be maintained 
at levels that just keep the biodiesel 
industry afl oat. ◆
and 31.5 billion gallons, respectively. 
The long-run corn price is deter-
mined solely by ethanol producers’ 
ability to pay for corn in these two 
scenarios.
Cautionary Notes
Economists loathe making predic-
tions about where future prices are 
headed because they are so often 
wrong. The long-run predictions of 
corn prices given here are predicat-
ed on a number of key assumptions. 
When Will the Bubble Burst?
Continued from page 3
The fi rst is that current government 
biofuel mandates will be maintained 
despite opposition from an array 
of groups. The biodiesel mandates 
will increase the price of oilseeds, 
thus increasing competition for 
corn land, which results in the $4.00 
price of corn at 15 billion gallons of 
ethanol. If the biodiesel mandates 
are relaxed (but the ethanol man-
date is maintained), the long-run 
corn price will be lower. The second 
key assumption is that corn yields 
will continue to grow as they have in 
the past. If seed companies increase 
the rate of yield growth, then the 
corn supply curve will shift to the 
right in the graph. This shift will 
lower the long-run corn price if the 
ethanol mandate binds. However, 
if the mandate does not bind, then 
the shift simply means that the corn 
ethanol sector will grow even larger, 
leaving the long-run price of corn 
unchanged. Third, if the futures 
markets are completely wrong and 
crude oil prices drop signifi cantly, 
then $2.50 gasoline will just be a bad 
memory. However, because of the 
corn ethanol mandate, the price of 
corn will be determined by the man-
date, as in scenario 1. ◆ 
